More than once in early-twentieth century South Africa, the government mobilised Afrikaner landowners against militant urban workers. Much of the military force that overwhelmed a general strike by white workers in January 1914 was drawn
from the countryside.
1 About a decade later, in 1922, there was a historic strike by white workers on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, the conurbation centred on Johannesburg. When the strike erupted into armed insurrection, thousands of white farmers -these would have been military reservists organised into mounted units known as burger commandos -swept into action at the behest of the government. The air force, artillery, permanent military units, reserves not based in the countryside (for example, the Durban Light Infantry, the Imperial Light Horse, the Transvaal Scottish Regiment) as well as a militarised police force were also thrown at the rebels. economic interests. The analysis, then, might be considered as something of a casestudy in how class interest shapes political response.
There was certainly a belief that the farmers, unlike their compatriots who suppressed the general strike in 1914, would side with the rebellious strikers and thereby immeasurably strengthen the armed revolt of 1922. In the 1914 case, it is not surprising that Afrikaner landowners rode in against the strikers. The party then in power -the South African National Party led by Generals Louis Botha and Jan Smuts -represented the great majority of Afrikaner landowners, and the farmers could be expected to rally to the call of the government when its authority was challenged.
Moreover, organised labour -this was always white labour at this time -was still largely associated with people of British (or British imperial) stock, the historic enemy of Boer/Afrikaner nationalism. Afrikaner farmers also had something of a suspicion of the supposed corruption of the urban world, 4 the world after all dominated by uitlanders (foreigners) who had brought war and imperialism to the Boer republics.
However, developments in the decade after the general strike of 1914 might have been expected to alter the relationship of many white farmers to urban militants.
There were now substantial numbers of Afrikaners amongst the strikers. Moreover, there had been a notable fragmentation and re-alignment in white politics. Afrikaner nationalists had begun to peel away from the ruling South African National Party. In
1914, nationalist-minded SANP MPs from the Orange Free State joined General
Hertzog in forming the National Party. When South Africa joined Britain in the First World War, this so outraged many rural Afrikaners that they joined a rebellion. This was crushed by the Botha-Smuts government, but led to a rising wave of Afrikaner nationalism that spread support for Hertzog's National Party. It now became a country-wide force. Moreover, by the time of the 1922 strike, the party in power, now called the South African Party, had fused with the pro-imperial Unionist Party, and it was led by General Smuts, viewed by many as a collaborator with British imperialism. Increasing numbers of Afrikaners were alienated from the Smuts government. Perhaps the farmers amongst them could no longer be counted on to obey its orders to scotch a workers' rebellion.
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Elements of this argument might be persuasive, but one should nevertheless be careful about supposing that Afrikaner landowners were overwhelmingly Nationalist supporters by this time. Indeed, even in 1924, when the South African Party lost power to a coalition of the National and Labour Parties, it was still getting markedly more votes in every province of South Africa (except for the Orange Free State) than the Nationalists: in the Cape, the SAP held perhaps 60% of all parliamentary seats.
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A fair number would have been rural. 7 It is true that, by the time of the 1924 general election -both in the Transvaal province, where the Witwatersrand was located, and in the Orange Free State, whose northern reaches were close to the Rand -farmers' constituencies revealed a pronounced (and sometimes overwhelming) tendency to incline to the National Party. But it must still be emphasised that, in the general election of 1921, the year before the great strike and rebellion, many rural constituencies in the Transvaal did not elect Nationalist parliamentarians: one of the great gains of the National Party in 1924 lay particularly in the Transvaal's farming 5 For a superb account of the political developments referred to, see W. K. Hancock's classic Smuts.
The sanguine years, 1870 -1919 (Cambridge, 1962 and Smuts. The fields of force, (Cambridge, 1968 On the last similar occasion, in 1914, the Government relied largely upon the burghers from the districts surrounding the Rand. It is said that since then the attitude of these men has undergone a considerable change owing to the spread of Nationalism and to the fact that numbers of them now have relatives employed on the mines…. It has been rumoured that, if these burghers were called out, some would refuse service or alternatively, after enrolment, would range themselves on the side of the strikers.
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It is noteworthy that the governor-general referred to a phenomenon other than nationalism that that might now lead the burger commandos from the countryside to side with strikers: their familial connections with miners. If, in earlier industrial upheavals, white strikers tended to be associated principally with people of British or British imperial origin, this was no longer so. Such had been the pace of Afrikaner urbanisation that, at the time of the 1922 strike, at least half of the strikers were Afrikaners: the general secretary of the white miners' union, E. Hendrikz, was himself an Afrikaner. Moreover, a very high proportion of these Afrikaner mineworkers did indeed have ties to the countryside. Their country origins were manifest in a number of ways -whether in that evidence of mineworkers keeping cows; 10 in the way in which scores of mineworkers worked agricultural plots in Putfontein near Benoni, east of Johannesburg; 11 andmost dramatically -in the very large numbers of horses that the strikers paraded on.
When the white workers' movement, influenced by ex-servicemen in its ranks, elaborated a paramilitary structure known as strike commandos (not to be confused with the burger commandos referred to above), these frequently had mounted sections. 12 It was to one of these that a leader of Germiston strikers referred when he spoke of die perde Kommando ('the horses Commando') under his authority. 13 That large numbers of mineworkers continued to keep horses -this could be costly for an urban worker, given costs of stabling and forage -is highly significant. The horse had always been a powerful cultural emblem for Afrikaner farmers. When workers held on to it in an urban milieu, this announced their origins on the land and the hope, perhaps, that they would return to it.
14 If the rural origins of many mineworkers provided a link to Afrikaner farmers that might lead landowners to support the strike, another factor could facilitate this. difficulties the strike caused for agriculturalists in the great market of the Rand.
However, notwithstanding the high quality of this press reporting, one must be on guard with respect to items 'planted' in the press by the employers, as also with respect to the exaggerations that sometimes coloured pronouncements from the strikers' camp. The contending parties were, after all, engaged in something of a propaganda war and appeals to farmers had a place in this.
I
Opponents and supporters of the strike were certainly framing their ideological contest with an eye to the farmers. This can be shown in the employers' propagation of the abstract and rather unconvincing idea that farmers were suffering because of 'the high wages paid to organised labour'. Farmers had to be able 'to exchange products with those of other producers on a…fair basis', it was argued, and they would never be able to do so 'while organised labour on the railways, on the mines, and in town industries persist [ed] in claiming the right to be sustained…in a superior position to that of the farmer'. 23 This argument was reiterated by the Chamber of Mines -the collective organisation of mining companies -which also stressed that the income of mineworkers 'had risen enormously since 1914' while that of farmers 'remained stationary'. 24 (Actually, whilst in monetary terms, white mineworkers' wages had risen markedly during the First World War, given inflation, they had, in real terms, remained more or less fixed between 1914 and 1920.) 25 The farmers, argued the Chamber opaquely, were exploited by white mine workers: 'an unfair exchange of labour' was taking place.
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Representatives of labour, meanwhile, made their own appeal to the farmers.
A miners' leader in Brakpan, east of Johannesburg, described some of the work of his 'Propaganda Committee': 'We sent out men to tell the country people exactly why we had come out on strike, and [why we] were remaining out…' 27 A leaflet in Afrikaans, meanwhile, included a message from a leading trade unionist, and advanced the idea that the strikers' cause was in the interests of farmers. If black labour edged out whites on the mines, it was argued, the consequences for the farmers would be dire:
die annvraag vir hul [lle] produkte sal verminder ('the demand for their products will diminish') and black farm labour would become prohibitively expensive. 28 Indeed, argued the general secretary of the miners' union, black workers would be drawn away from the farms as they sought new and better-paid positions once held by whites: 'the backveld farmers would lose seriously in native labour, because farm labourers would flock to the mines to get the higher pay'. 29 A defeat of the white workers, it was publicly declared to a crowd of strikers in Johannesburg, would mean that 'the farmers must go down, too, once and for all' for, as the strike had demonstrated, they depended upon a white working class market. In the speeches to strikers, the rural masters were frequently mentioned. The mineworkers desperately needed to hear that their cause was supported by other constituencies of whites, not least the farmers who had proved so potent an enemy in the past. Thus, when crowds of workers gathered, they were repeatedly told that the farmers were with them, as in a speech that referred to the "backveld" having 'come up to the scratch', realising that the employers were seeking 'to starve the men into submission'; or in that address in which it was argued that the mining companies had been wrong footed by the 'sympathy of the country for the townsmen'. The farmers, it was strongly implied, would not allow the workers to be starved back to work and the employers were now 'shaking'.
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Such speeches -with that emphasis on preventing starvation -remind us that the strikers needed food supplies from the farmers. This is why the leader of the miners' union was described in early February 1922 as 'leaving immediately for the country districts to collect foodstuffs from the farmers'. 33 As one leader of strike commandos remarked after the workers' movement of 1922 had been suppressed:
'Prominent strikers did go out into the country to collect, and held meetings all over 'come in from the country', but he referred to the 'hopes that the frequently expressed sympathy of the farmers will materialise substantially'. 44 The implication is that the assertions regarding the support of the farmers seemed out of kilter with the actual volume of aid so far received from them. There was no flood of provisions.
Of much greater importance to the strikers were urban sources of support.
These came not only from the strata and organisations already alluded to. The resources of local government could also be tapped. In a mining town like Brakpan, the white community was dominated by mineworkers and they could ensure that municipal resources were utilized in their support. In early March, the strike now two months old and burning on towards insurrection, the employers sought to evict strikers and their families from residences on mining property. Moreover, all farmers were afflicted by a post-war recession and they were likely to view a long, disruptive strike as running counter to their interests. During the strike itself, the president of the Transvaal Agricultural Union (TAU) told its annual congress that agriculturalists had been hit very hard by 'the cessation of work in the gold mines' which was 'paralysing their chief local market at a time when they were least able to bear it'. 47 In fact, a sizeable number of letters was received by the TAU from farmers concerned about the issue.
48
It was not merely that the usual agricultural sales in the white community were disrupted by the strike. The mining industry itself was a major purchaser of farm products for the feeding of black mineworkers. But the work stoppage had led the companies temporarily to terminate the recruitment of black labourers to replace any whose contracts expired. While most black mineworkers remained on company property and were paid throughout the strike, the black workforce was seriously depleted by the cessation of recruitment, the endless departure of workers whose contracts ended, as also through the apparent right given to the employers to terminate contracts where black workers were 'desirous of returning home'. 49 By the end of January, the strike only three weeks old, the black workforce on the goldmines had been reduced by almost 38 000 workers. 50 About three weeks later, an 'army of 43, 000 expatriated labourers' was referred to and the public was reminded that no black migrant workers were 'now coming into the labour districts'. It is possible that some of these workers were not employed on the mines since the men referred to were 'time-expired mines and works labourers'. was almost two months old, the size of the black workforce on the Rand had been slashed by about 47 000. 52 This would have reduced considerably the food purchases of the mining companies. 'The native exodus affects the farmer and local producer considerably,' declared one newspaper at a point when this exodus was set to grow. It then enumerated the losses suffered by producers and sellers of agricultural goods:
It is estimated that the consumption of mealie meal in the compounds [the residential complexes for black workers] has been reduced by 400 or 500 bags…per day. As the regular weekly ration of the mine boy includes 3 lbs. of meat, as well as ¾ lb. of "soup" meat, the farmer and butcher equally stand to lose. The…compound ration of vegetables normally requires a considerable quantity of potatoes, pumpkins, carrots, beans, and so forth. The bread bill for the underground native is a big item. Suppliers of all these commodities are affected… 53 To take merely one of the products mentioned above -meat. The total weekly ration amounted to about 4 lbs. per worker. To understand the weekly loss to farmers and butchers one has to multiply that figure by tens of thousands -that is, the number of 'repatriated' black workers. And to this figure must be added the losses to butchers and farmers resulting from the collapsing market for meat amongst the strikers. By the mid-point of the strike, for example, the butchers of the mining town of Benoni had to inform strikers who had not settled debts from the preceding month that they could no longer buy on credit. 54 As to the ramifications of such developments even far away in the countryside, Die Burger could report on one livestock auction in the Cape where the sellers evidently would not agree to sell anything omdat die pryse so laag was ('because the prices were so low'). The reason given for the paltry amounts offered by potential buyers? The strike.
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It is possible that some press reports regarding the strike's impact on farmers were propaganda placed by the mining companies, which historically had powerful connections to newspapers of the Witwatersrand. 56 Business archives disclose that the employers spent a great deal on propaganda during the strike: some individuals received what were substantial sums for the day -in one case 250 guineas; in another, 400 guineas -'for their services in regard to propaganda' . And after the strike, the employers were required to provide £10 000 to their representative organisation 'to meet the expenses of the Propaganda Sub-committee'. 57 Scores upon scores of interventions were drafted, some specifically addressed to farmers' concerns.
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Certain anonymous letters in the press ostensibly from farmers pressed the case for not supporting the strikers or asserted that the overwhelming bulk of white agriculturalists in the Transvaal were ready 'to obey the legally constituted authority of the country when called upon'. 59 That was a way of announcing that the farmers would be ready once more to ride in to suppress the strikers. There is something suspiciously tailor-made about such anonymous letters, not least because one can demonstrate that a letter of this kind could specifically counter sentiments in support of the strikers that were earlier reported in the same newspaper. 60 And, certainly, one
Rand Daily Mail report headed 'Giving the stuff away' (sub-title: 'Farmers' complaints about Rand strike') was so crafted as to raise suspicions that it was serving a propaganda function. After citing a farmer talking of 'the impossibility of selling any kind of produce' at a profit, the article closed off with this alleged quote from 56 The which reveal the impact of the strike. At one point, there was 'a sudden collapse' in the cattle market. The quality of beasts brought to market was one reason, but it was not the only one, for even animals described as 'good mediums' drew virtually no bids. As the report ran: 'Butchers bought only for bare necessities, and speculators who despatch cattle to other centres did no business at all. In fact, many of the big buyers were absent from the market. This, of course, is directly due to the labour troubles.' 63 Later on, the market was reported to be suffering to such a degree that any farmers who were able to do so were advised to 'keep back their stock and produce'.
'As the strike continues so does business become worse', it was stated: 'Farmers are feeling the effects of the industrial troubles severely.' 64 There were days at market during this time that 'old hands' would consider the worst in memory. 65 It was also reported that there had been a colossal reduction in purchases of fruit on the Rand -'the elimination of the Johannesburg market' was actually referred to. This had combined with economic difficulties in the diamond mining centre of Kimberley and a bounteous fruit harvest to create the most acute difficulties for sellers of fruit from the Western Cape. Other markets were sought, most notably Port Elizabeth, but the situation was dire, with fruit prices sinking dramatically. 66 Moreover, this disruption of the agricultural market by the strike was afflicting white farmers who were already sorely tried by an acute economic crisis. Helen
Bradford has most powerfully demonstrated just how crushing the economic situation was for white farmers in the 1920s generally: the terms of trade had swung severely against agricultural producers, and prices had declined considerably in the war and post-war years. 67 As the strike on the gold mines began, an Afrikaans newspaper quoted an official publication to the effect that the income of farmers had 'sunk lower' (lager gedaald) than their expenditure. 68 Die Burger, a Nationalist newspaper that supported the strikers, was emphatic in pointing to the inability of the country to soak up its agricultural production; and it warned early on that the work stoppage would rapidly affect farmers dependent on the Johannesburg market. When the same newspaper ran a giant advertisement placed by the mining employers that was addressed to farmers and that reminded them that the gold-mining zone was the country's greatest market, and which asserted that the strike was threatening it with catastrophe, it may given many farmers pause for thought.
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In these circumstances most farmers would have been impatient with urban movements that made matters worse for them. Reuters reported from one rural area:
'the public in this district show no sympathy with the strikers' because of 'the low price of agricultural products' then obtaining. The report came during a very early stage of the stoppage, and yet -even then -the view expressed by the whites of the district was a desire for the strike to end immediately. 70 An exceptionally angry -but anonymous -letter in the press came from a Transvaal farmer and may have been invented and placed in the Rand Daily Mail by the employers. However, when it poured scorn on the idea of provisioning urban 'hot-heads', and spoke of how even a good number of better-off farmers had been 'completely broken' by the economic situation, and that others were mortgaged to the hilt, it was speaking a language that a great many farmers would have understood. 71 Like the best propaganda, this letter pointed to facts.
The farmers were a rural master class who lorded it over black tenants and workers, but many of them were struggling members of such a class, and it is clear that a common view amongst them was that the white mineworkers were a rather prosperous lot. A. J. Venter, a farmer in the Northern Transvaal who had once been employed on the mines, complained that the working hours of the farmer were longer than those of the white mineworker; that, unlike that worker, he had no guaranteed annual leave, and -he reminded -his readers: Hier kan jij nie staak nie… ('Here you can't strike…'). 72 In a speech before a few thousand people on the east Rand during the strike, Tielman Roos, the leader of the Transvaal National Party and a man sympathetic to the strikers, felt compelled to tell his audience that: 'The country people were led to believe that the miners earned enormous sums in wages; it would be an eye-opener to these people if the miners gave publicity to their actual earnings.' 73 It is not clear that this would have convinced a farmer such as A. van Graan, despite the fact that he must have lived relatively near white mining communities -he came from the district of Krugersdorp. So far as he was concerned, the strike was calamitous to farmers and, he believed, it was engaged in by people who generally procured a higher income than them. 74 The struggling landowner was a common image, which is why an Afrikaner nationalist newspaper during the strike stressed the hard life of the 'thousands and thousands' of farmers whose toil went unrewarded. 75 Such people would not necessarily be sympathetic to the white mineworkers. Perhaps a belief in their prosperity explains why, in Cradock in the Eastern Cape, farmers met together -a Nationalist MP in their midst -and condemned the mineworkers' objectives as 'unreasonable'. 76 The mining companies, of course, were wont to rub in the idea of the high-rolling white mineworker.
Another, more complex, part of the farmers' consciousness and position needs to be emphasised. The white workers overwhelmingly made their appeal to the farmers on a racial basis: after the suppression of the strike, it was affirmed in court that the strikers, in procuring provisions from the rural areas, 'always represented' their cause 'to the country side' as a struggle 'for a "white South Africa"'. 77 That struggle was construed in terms of ensuring that black labour did not displace white labour on the mines. But the farmers' attitude to white labour was not that different from the mine managers'. Commercial farming in South Africa, as much as mining, depended upon cheap, black labour. Generally, farmers would avoid using white labour where they could use black. The mining companies' intention to substitute black for white workers at far lower wages expressed a logic that virtually every white farmer could appreciate. Indeed, white farmers commanded an economic regime that had taken this logic to its extreme. One sixth of the wage workers in the mining sector were white; the proportion of white wage workers in agriculture was so miniscule as to be barely discernible. If one was looking for a sector of the South African economy from which white wage workers had been more or less completely excluded by employers, it was agriculture.
This point was rubbed home during the strike in a propaganda initiative damned by one newspaper as a lompe bedrog (a 'clumsy deceit'). 78 Actually, the initiative, clearly sponsored by the mining companies, was rather clever. In mid- stakers ('in sympathy with the strikers'). 80 Nationalism, however, was likely to buttress support by landowners. There were evidently many Afrikaner workers who originally hailed from the Orange Free State, a nationalist stronghold, and it was held that generous aid to the strikers came from this area. According to the man who gave this evidence, support from the countryside generally was rising as the strike wore on.
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On the other hand, we should remember that the farmers' preference for utilizing black labour instead of white was actually even stronger than that of the mining companies, and that this preference was motivated by similar concerns: above all, a desire for a labour force that was cheap, unorganised, and politically undefended. 
88
Above all, we must recognise that farmers -whether or not they sympathised with the workers, and whether they supported Smuts's South African Party or Hertzog's National Party -stood to lose a great deal from the Rand strike: their economic situation was already very difficult in the early-1920s and the strike entailed a reduction in their market. When the Rand strike became the Rand Revolt, then, and the government sought to mobilize farmers for action against the strikers, it was in the class interests of the farmers to suppress the workers. Perhaps this was one reason why General Smuts, the prime minister, was confident that the reservists from the countryside -the burger commandos -could be counted on: 'We could…get thousands of suitable men from rural areas', he declared, as the strike was about to enter its last weeks. Later, on the eve of the workers' rebellion, he supported the calling up of men from 'surrounding districts' and expressed himself in terms that suggest he felt no possibility of the farmers inclining to the workers' cause for any reason whatever: 'we shall have the most loyal support of the burghers in this crisis'. 89 The workers in 1922, of course, hoped that the farmers would not ride in to suppress them: a union leader recalled the workers' awareness of how strikers had been 'roughly treated' by the burger commandos in the past. 90 In fact, in the early days of the strike, there was certainly a fear on the part of organised labour that the farmers might once more be mobilized against them. This is surely what accounts for that early attempt of the general secretary of the miners' union to dissuade farmers from coming into town in order to maintain order. It is true that this was framed in terms of racial order: organised labour was perfectly capable of dealing with any disturbances that arose amongst the black population, it was asserted, and 'the farmers have no need [die boere nie nodig het nie] to leave their farms for such a purpose. 91 But this was really a coded call to the farmers not to obey any government call to ride into the towns as they had done before. It was tantamount to saying: 'Stay away. We don't really trust you.'
However, as the strike wore on and as it was seen as more and more likely to lead to a test of arms, the farmers came to be viewed by the most desperate and committed of the strikers as a source of potential military support. Hadn't they received foodstuffs from the farmers? And hadn't the leaders of the workers endlessly assured them of support from the countryside? Given this, it is hardly surprising that some in the labour movement came to believe that, when their rising began, the farmers would turn upon the government forces. At a meeting of military leaders of strikers -this was a week before the rebellion of 1922 -the possibility of the rapid arrival of military aid from the rural areas was mooted; should this occur, it was implied, the appropriate military strategy was to hold the urban zone until these reinforcements arrived: 'you have to keep the town until assistance comes from the country'. 92 On the day before the rebellion, a key strike commando leader in in the western Witwatersrand, and they also participated in the campaigns in the east and in Johannesburg itself. Their casualties were light, but the effect of their deployment was great: on the East Rand, where the armed insurrection was initially formidable, the fact that the burger commandos had arrived in the zone was held to be fundamental to the rebels losing heart. 95 And the rural masters under arms were to be particularly saluted by the more conventional military forces when they made their appearance in central Fordsburg, the last significant stronghold of the workers'
rebellion. Here 'a big contingent of burghers.…were greeted by their comrades in arms, both in blue and in khaki, with resounding cheers. All sides doffed hats and helmets…'. 96 To understand why farmers rode in against white workers in 1922, perhaps we need to consider that, by the end of the strike of that year, many farmers had had enough of the upheaval that was exacerbating their economic distress. This factor might have been considered by that historian who has found it so 'surprising'
(verrassend) that rural commandos, said to have been Nationalists, so readily participated in the drive against the rebellious workers. 97 As the strike entered its eighth week, the prime minister was informed by one intimately involved in the Nevertheless, he was convinced that both supporters of Smuts's party and the National Party would, if it came to it, obey the summons om wet en orde te handhaaf ('to uphold law and order'). 99 He had every right to this confidence: a month earlier, even Nationalists were being advised by one of their leaders that maintaining order was die plig van die Regering ('the duty of the Government') and if the burgers were called to arms on that basis, they were to answer it. 100 At any rate, when the government began to mobilize its forces, it was evident that it could count on help from the rural areas. There is a little evidence that the authorities investigated an accusation -it was denied -that a farmer had been discouraged on nationalist grounds from enlisting against the strikers. 101 But the state record generally discloses something else: a pleasure in the farmers' response.
'Regiments filling up fast', the prime minister was informed by telegram on the day before the workers' rebellion, 'and volunteers even from country districts [are] coming up well.' 102 And during the rebellion itself a member of the cabinet was informed that the burger commandos were 'mobilizing fast'. 103 Indeed, the nationalist
